In constitutional theory, the referendum is an instrument that allows for the expression of the popular will in government decisions and through which people are asked to vote directly on an issue or policy. Over the last decades, the referendum has been the instrument used by minority groups to claim their independence supported by popular will. 
Introduction
In constitutional theory, the referendum (from the Latin expression ad referendum, meaning "convocation to referee") is an instrument of direct democracy that allows the expression of the popular will in government decisions and through which people are asked to vote directly on an issue or policy (Morel 2012: 502) . Thanks to the influence exercised by Rousseau's ideas, and mainly the idea that the only valid form of legislation was popular legislation, it is possible to find the first constitutional traces of the referendum in the 1793
French Constitution (which remained inactive) and in the Swiss constitutional order (federal and cantonal) in which, since 1848, the referendum found extensive and wellstructured prediction (Salerno 1988: 202) . While no explicit reference to referendums or popular consultation was provided in the 1787 US Constitution, referendums started to be used by American states from the end of XVIII century, thanks to the influence exercised by the Progressive Movement and by the idea of the need to extend the use of the popular will (Salerno 1988: 203) .
Although the referendum has been a subject of interest in legal science since its first conceptualisation, this interest has increased in the XX century, following the greater use of referendum, both internationally I and constitutionally (as evidenced in the composition of moral, economic etc. (Morel 2012: 508) .
The recent comparative experience, of the last 30 years, shows us an increasing trend in using the referendum as a tool to support minority groups' demands for independence.
Apart from those cases in which the independence request came from oppressed people as the expression of their right to self-determination, there has been an increasing use of the referendum by minority groups living in consolidated democratic states. Usually they are groups with a specific historical and cultural heritage, distinct from the majority, which already enjoy regional and/or federal political autonomy status: their demand is directed to obtaining the sovereignty that they consider belongs to them, through secession from the State they are part of.
For Qvortrup (2014: 1-4) , since the Second World War there have been slightly more than fifty referendums on independence. The conditions under which these took place were very different: for example, the referendum in French Guinea that was held in 1958 was part of the decolonisation process that took place in the second half of the XX From a political point of view, the outcome of a referendum on independence is related to multiple elements. However, to be constitutionally legitimate, secession requires that certain essential elements be respected. Since most contemporary constitutions are silent on this point, with very few exceptions, III constitutional judges have been responsible for determining which elements should be respected to allow a constitutional secession. More specifically, this article will deal with two main aspects: the constitutional nature of a referendum on independence or secession, and its possible legal effects.
In this regard, in the following pages we will first see the theoretical configuration of secession, and the transition from a de facto institution to a subjective legal situation which, in some cases, clearly provides for its qualification as a right (paragraph II 118/2015, and the latest decision of the Spanish Constitutional Tribunal in the Catalonia saga (Decision no. 114/2017), will be analysed (respectively in paragraphs IV and V). This choice is mainly due because both constitutional judges have faced the same problems in dealing with an internal entity with intents on secession, and have both chosen analogous solutions, inspired by similar constitutional principles to those developed by the Supreme Court of Canada's 1998 decision.
Last, some final considerations on the emergence of a constitutional tendency among constitutional judges, on the use of referendums for independence, will be developed in paragraph V.
Secession, Constitution and Referendum
Secession, as the "formal withdrawal from a central authority by a member unity" (Wood 1981: 110) There was no place for reconsideration or revocation, except through revolution or through consent of the States." VII Secession has become considered as a taboo, and has almost become forbidden by constitutional law that has given prevalence and priority to the principle of unity of the State.
According to the compact theory, however, secession is an inherent right related to the belief that -with specific reference to Southern States of the US -the union between states is made on a volunteer basis. Moreover, secession has been justified by the inherentpower argument, according to which States have the power to reassert their previous status of sovereignty and-as Calhoun argued (1992)-due to the absence of federal power (Neff 2015: 407-401 E -111 also seemed to include the right to secede, but only for oppressed peoples (Ruggiu 2016: 75) . As a matter of fact, contemporary international doctrine considers secession as an extreme remedy to situations in which a State has committed a gross violation on the right to free self-determination of a people, or other fundamental human rights of minorities, or other groups which are under its sovereignty. Secession as a remedial right is constituted when a State exercises a form of abusive sovereignty that, from an international point of view, would justify the "rebellion against tyranny and oppression" indicated in the Preamble of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a legitimate reaction.
Here, secession is strongly related to the right of free self-determination of peoples in its external perspective: in this case, the right to self-determination is denied by the State, whose claim rests on the principle of State integrity and unity. However, rather than authorising the right to secession, the trend is to ask the State to stop committing the violation and to reestablish the status quo ante. Even if the trend is toward the prevalence of the principle of state integrity over secession, X as established in paragraph 7 of the United Nation General Assembly Resolution n. 2625 (XXV), the State's right to have its integrity respected is strictly conditional on the respect the State gives to internal self-determination, giving representation to the whole people, including minority groups (Murswiek 1993: 38) .
These had been the guiding principles during the decolonisation process; however, since the end of this process in the 1990s, secession claims have started to gain a new profile. First of all, they come from minority groups with historical, cultural and linguistic specificities. Secondly, these groups are part of consolidated democratic States within which they already have specific political autonomy: the aim of their independence claims is to regain lost sovereignty. Thirdly, they do not seek to use the referendum as an instrument to participate in government or policy making decision, but rather they use the popular consultation instrument to give space to a minority will.
At the moment, very few Constitutions explicitly recognize a right to secession (the The position of the Canadian government has been to leverage mono-national sentiments, which was considered the foundation of the 1867 British North America Act (BNAA) (Groppi 2006: 29-31) , resulting from the compromise between the colonies, including those that were not part of the Federation at an early stage. This compromise was considered as the pactum societatis, whose rationale is to be found not in territorial collectivities, but rather in the consensus given by individual citizens to the Federation.
The aim of the BNAA was ambiguous: on one side, the English-speaking founding fathers intended to create a great British North American nation; while, on the other side, This was followed by a growing involvement of the province in the fields of labour, economics and education, with the consequent expansion of the bureaucratic provincial apparatus. This was also the time when a nationalist sentiment was revitalised, which changed the attitude of the French-speaking community that then began to defend their own interests. The Quebec government called for more powers, but at that time the federal union was never questioned. In spite of the negative outcome of the referendum, the Parti Québécois won the next year's provincial assembly elections and re-established itself in government as an interpreter of the interests and will of the Quebec people, and hence the only official interlocutor with the central government.
In 1982, the Constitution Act was approved and the Canadian Constitution was repatriated: for Quebec, the repatriation of the Constitution was an unlawful act, due to its unwillingness to adhere to the new constitutional pact. As a consequence, the province has After just over a month, the people were called to the polls to express their vote on Quebec's accession to the condition of sovereignty. While in 1980 the people were to decide on whether to give a mandate for negotiating an agreement with the Federal Government recognizing the sovereignty of Quebec, the 1995 referendum on sovereignty was no longer about delegation to intergovernmental negotiations; rather it was directed to know the Quebec people's will on accession to sovereignty. Negotiations after the popular consultation were to be limited to a proposal for a new form of political-economic association between the two sovereignty entities (Canada and Quebec). Despite increasing popular support for the independence solution, the result of the referendum was once again negative. The referendum, in which almost 94% of citizens participated, was rejected with 50.6% of negative votes. After the negative result of the referendum, the central government sought to reduce preferences for independence, and the Federal Parliament approved a resolution recognizing the distinct nature of Quebec society.
In 1996, the Federal Government, using the reference instrument, asked the Supreme Court to issue a reference on the legitimacy, in domestic as well as international law, of a Against this backdrop, the Court stated that the referendum, even though it has no direct legal effect and is therefore legally unfit for a unilateral secession, is in any case the expression of a democratic will, and in the case of the referendum in Quebec the will of a part of the Quebec people. Consequently, a referendum that brings a clear expression to the Quebec people should be given a considerable weight: it is the application of the principle of the clarity of the majority, meaning that the results of the referendum must not be ambiguous both in relation to the question submitted to the vote, and as to the level of support achieved (Reference Re Secession of Quebec, cit., para. 86).
Consequently, if there is a clear indication by a province of the will to pursue secession, the principle of federalism, coupled with the democratic one, binds each and every one of the parties of the Confederation to negotiate constitutional changes that are functional to the implementation of this will. The Constitution of Canada is the product of the sovereignty of the Canadian people, and that power makes it possible to make any constitutional change deemed appropriate within the Canadian territory (Reference Re Secession of Quebec, cit., para. 87), thus rejecting the extreme hypothesis that the other Provinces and the Federal Government would have to passively accept the unilateral will of Quebec. A unilateral declaration of independence carried out at the margins of law and constitutionality, and possibly accompanied by a declaration of unconstitutionality of the Court, might well only be successful in the case of an entity which had effective control over the territory, and from the subsequent recognition of the international community.
Consequently, the judges of the Supreme Court excluded that external and/or internal self-determination might be established in the case of the intent of secession of Quebec: the only constitutional right granted to Quebec to satisfy their will to independence would have been to initiate the legal proceedings provided for in the Constitution for its revision.
After the Supreme Court decision, the Clarity Act was approved, which set out the rules to be observed in negotiations between the federal government and a province that wants to secede. According to the Court, the referendum is a link between the people and government institutions: it is not a form of spontaneous exercise of collective freedom of expression.
Rather, it fulfills a function: to initiate, influence or counter public decision-making processes, mostly regulatory, even in cases where there is no immediate legal effect on the sources of law. These characteristics mean that a referendum can be launched by a Region on issues of interest of the regional community. But it also means that regional referendums can cover areas beyond the boundaries of regional subjects and territory, up to the point of interlinking with the national dimension. XXV At the same time, this does not mean that Regions can take initiatives -even of popular consultation -free in form, or beyond the limits set by constitutional provisions. The Constitution and Regional Statutes (as indicated in Art. 123 of the Constitution) establish the regional referendum discipline framework within which each Region can move and define its own political autonomy: XXVI autonomy that must be carried out in harmony with constitutional principles and dispositions.
XXVII Respect for constitutional principles and dispositions implies that even though each
Region has the freedom and autonomy to establish the forms, ways and criteria of popular participation in the democratic control processes of its acts, XXVIII once these choices have been taken and consecrated in the Regional Statute, they apply to the subsequent regional activity, even legislative, given the fundamental character of the Regional Statute and its relationship with the regional laws drawn up by the Constitution in terms of both hierarchy and competence. Linking in this way with previous actions of the institutions of the Generalitat, the regional legislature sought to finalise its secession process from the Spanish State, which had given rise, in successive phases, to many decisions of unconstitutionality by the Constitutional Tribunal in respect of the so-called "constituent process" in Catalonia. is characterized for three main elements. First of all, there is a constitutional tendency in considering the Constitution as a pactum societatis between all the individuals. In consequence any change to the constitution considered as a pactum societatis must be agreed between all citizens, including the possible secession of part of the territory that is inadmissible, such as a unilateral secession or a secession based only on the will of people territorially involved in the secession.
Secondly, there is a common constitutional trend toward the idea that the referendum is an instrument to allow people to take part in government or public policy decisions. It can also be an instrument capable of expressing a minority will, but this will cannot produce binding legal effects on the majority. Constitution, because they were related to tax matters. The Court underlined that these provisions violated the constitutional principles in the field of coordination of public finances since they affect the bonds of solidarity between the regional population and the rest of the Republic. In addition, the possibility that the Veneto Region was included among the regions with special statute affects fundamental constitutional choices that cannot be subject to regional referendums. XXV Constitutional Court Judgments no. 496/2000; no. 470/1992; and no. 256/1989 
